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21. Introduction
By focussing on cumulativeness and spillover effects of technological knowledge,
theories on technological regimes are predominantly supply side oriented in
explaining industrial dynamics. For instance, low cumulativeness and high
spillover conditions facilitate the entry process and impede the persistence
monopolistic advantages (Breschi et al., 1996; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). If
such conditions apply to the technological regime of an industry, these theories
predict a highly dynamic firm population with a low level of concentration.
Hence, causality runs from properties of the technological knowledge base of
suppliers to the demographic characteristics of the population they constitute. This
paper aims to introduce demand side considerations as a complementary
explanation for industrial dynamics.
As in Shy (1996), the degree of substitutability between the quality and the
network size of a technology and the degree of compatibility of succeeding
technologies are the key determinants of the simulation model presented here.
However, Shy (1996) mainly limits his focus to the demand side, as he
investigates how varying consumer preferences over technology advance and
network size effects the timing and frequency of new technology adoption. Our
focus is on the relation between the demand side and the supply side. Given
variations in consumer preferences over quality and network sizes, and different
degrees of compatibility between succeeding technologies, we investigate how the
resulting differences in the timing and frequency of new technology adoptions by
consumers effect the dynamics of the population of supplying firms. Furthermore,
we will investigate whether these effects are different under various technological
regimes.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section the conceptual basis
for the model will be explained, and special attention will be paid to how we
modelled firm growth. Section three formally presents the simulation model, of
which the results will be analysed in section four. Section five focuses on how
these results are effected when different technological regimes are considered.
Section six concludes this paper.
2. The conceptual basis
As mentioned in the introduction, the primary aim of the present model is to
investigate how differences in the diffusion of new technologies affect the
dynamics of the population of firms in an industry. Shy (1996) explains the
differences in timing and frequency by differences in consumer preferences. In his
model, the generation of entering consumers chooses whether to purchase a
certain product based on an old technology already used by an older generation of
consumers or whether to purchase the product based on the new technology with a
higher quality. The young generation chooses the new technology if the utility
3from the high quality technology combined with the size of the network
associated with the new technology overtakes the utility from the old technology
with its associated network size. The size of the network of the new technology is
the sum the population size of the young generation and a certain percentage of
the old generation of users. This percentage is determined by the degree of
compatibility between the old and new technology. Hence, the higher the
compatibility, the larger the network size associated with the new technology will
be. Shy (1996) then shows that a decrease in the degree of compatibility between
new and old technologies will increase the duration of each technology. Further,
by varying the degree of substitution between the quality and the network size of a
technology, he shows that the duration of each adopted technology is lower and
the frequency of technology adoptions is higher the more consumers value quality
and network size as substitutes rather than complements.
Hence, his focus on consumer preferences helps us understand “…why technology
is replaced more often in some industries than in others…” (Shy, 1996, p.786). He
also asserts that his model is general enough to capture a variety of market
structures. That is, he shows that both a persistent monopoly, as well as a more
competitive market structure with the entry of a new firm whenever a new
technology becomes available1, is consistent with his model. Our aim is to further
elaborate on the evolution of the supply side of industries experiencing repeated
adoption of new technologies. Although previous models on technological change
and industry evolution have investigated issues such as the evolution of the firm
population2, or the diffusion process of (subsequent) innovations3, they have not
explicitly linked these two processes. The model presented in this paper attempts
to fill this hiatus.
A secondary aim, or perhaps more a constraint, is that the model should
preferably be consistent with the stylised facts of industrial organisation. Among
these “facts” are: (i) persistence of market turbulence due to entry and exit, (ii)
high infant mortality, negatively correlated with firm age, (iii) growth rates of
firms that fall with age and with size, (iv) persistence of asymmetric
performances, and (v) skewed and stable size distributions.
Besides these stylised facts derived from the empirical literature, two interesting
observations from the Dutch manufacturing sector will be captured as well by the
model. The first one is that relative labour productivity or profitability cannot
explain the growth or decline of firms. There is no evidence that growing firms
are more productive (or profitable) than contracting firms. Hence, there seems to
be no evidence for the existence of some type of replicator dynamics. However,
the second observation is that relative productivity seems to be important in
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 Shy (1996) assumes that the new firm is endowed with a one period patent right on the new
technology, allowing it to (temporarily) charge a monopoly price.
2
 See, e.g.,  Nelson and Winter (1982), Winter (1984), and Dosi et al. (1995).
3
 See, e.g., Iwai (1984a, 1984b), Silverberg and Lehnert (1993), and Silverberg and Verspagen
(1994a, 1994b).
4explaining the probability of survival: low relative productivity practically means
exit, higher productivity significantly reduces the probability of exiting. Still, even
those firms with higher than average productivity levels have a fairly high
probability of suddenly experiencing falling productivity, often followed by their
exit from the industry.
In order to include these last two issues, we will model firm growth as a random
process and therefore abstain from any type of replicator dynamics. Hence, the
present model will not attempt to predict the growth process of a firm on the basis
of past or current performance levels. Of course, the relative performance of a
firm will matter in the model, but only in determining the probability of survival.
Therefore, in this model it is really a matter of survival of the fittest, as opposed to
expansion of the fittest. We have several reasons to exclude relative performance
as an explanatory variable of firm growth.
The growth or decline of a firm is ultimately a managerial decision: the
management decides on how much to invest and how many workers to hire or lay
off. Many factors may influence the final outcome of this decision. Past
performance is certainly one of them. Besides creating the necessary funds, high
profits in the past are a signal of a firm’s competitiveness, creating confidence
among the management and the potential investors. However, high profits may
also indicate a lag in mobilising effective competition, reflecting a windfall gain
from being properly positioned to take advantage of a change in level or character
of demand. In this last case the high profits may have resulted from mere chance,
and are not likely to be as persistent as profits resulting from having been superior
to competitors.
But probably more important than a firm’s past competitiveness in the growth
decision are the expectations of a firm regarding the state of the economy, the
condition of the industry, a firm’s own performance, et cetera. There are many
reasons why firms may have different expectations. First of all, the prospects may
differ between industries. When an industry is expected to grow rapidly, a firm
will be more inclined to expand than when prospects are less optimistic for the
industry. Second, firms within the same industry could have different information
sets on which the decision to grow is based. Third, even if firms would have the
same information, still they may perceive and interpret it differently, leading to
different expectations.
Naturally, different expectations lead to different decisions. Moreover, firms may
have different ambitions regarding their (ultimate) sizes or market shares. Some
firms may indeed be driven by enormous ambitions and try to capture the total
market as much as possible. But other firms may be less ambitious. Their aim
could be to acquire a certain amount of profits, and if this goal is reached at a
certain size they may decide to keep the size approximately fixed. Perhaps the
desire to grow is present latently, but if it is not strong enough no serious attempts
will be made to fulfil this desire. Finally, the situation on the markets for labour
5and capital goods may differ across industries. A shortage of labourers with skills
necessary for a specific firm probably hinders a firm’s desire to expand.
Combining the potential differences in expectations, ambitions and input markets
makes anticipating the growth paths of firms very difficult. As Geroski (1998)
argues, the growth of a firm may very well be understood, but also be hard to
describe or predict with any precision. Therefore, we will model the evolution of
the size of a firm as following a random walk, however with a declining positive
drift. This last property is consistent with the stylised fact that growth rates are
negatively correlated to the firm’s age.
After having described the two most distinguishing features of the model, i.e., its
focus on the repeated adoption of new technologies in relation to the dynamics of
the firm population, and the modelling of firm growth as an essentially random
process, we now turn to the technical details of the model.
3. The model
Consider an industry where in each discrete time period t, t = 0, 1, 2,…, the firm
population consists of N (t) firms. All firms in the industry are producing a certain
product that is defined by its functional characteristics. An essential assumption in
the model is that the function the product performs can be based on different
technologies. For instance, both the standard compact cassettes as well as the
compact disc (CD) are sound recording media, however analogue recording
technology underlies the compact cassette, whereas a CD is recorded by using
digital technology. However, our notion of a product also extents to producer or
capital goods. An example here could be industrial lathes, which can be manually
operated or operated by using computer numeric control (CNC) technology.
Every period a random number of new firms enter the industry according to a
Poisson process4 with arrival rate ρent. At birth, each firm i is endowed with a
firm-specific organisational competitiveness level λi, a product technology Ψ, and
a size si. The organisational competitiveness level λi is a random genotype
variable5 that sets for each firm a potential limit to its actual competitiveness,
creating some (initial) heterogeneity among firms with regard to their
organisational capabilities. As mentioned, this variable may limit the firm’s actual
competitiveness, but whether it actually does depends on its technological
competitiveness that is calculated as described below.
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 For practical reasons, we have adopted the Poisson process here and approximated it by five
hundred Bernoulli trials every period. For analytical convenience, the arrival rate is kept constant
over the simulation period.
5
 This variable is generated as follows. Let x ~ N (µλ ,σλ). Then λi = x if x ≤ µλ , and λi =max{0 ;
2µλ-x} if x > µλ.
6Competitiveness of firms
Assume that at every period Κ product technologies are available. At birth, every
firm is randomly endowed with a technology Ψ (Ψ  = 1, 2, Κ), such that the
probability of receiving a given technology is equal to 1 / (Κ). These technologies
are ranked according to their intrinsic quality level QΨ, such that QΚ > QΚ-1 >…>
Q1. Also, there is a class of old technologies Ψ  = 0 that all have an intrinsic
quality level Q0. Every β1 periods a pioneering entrant or incumbent introduces a
new, intrinsically better product technology that has become available due to
exogenous technological change. This introduction causes all technologies to drop
one level in their intrinsic quality. Hence, the newly introduced technology
becomes Κ (the technology with the highest quality level QΚ), and Ψ = 1 becomes
part of the class of old technologies Ψ  = 0 and degrades to the intrinsic quality
level Q0. Although firms can employ more than one product technology
simultaneously, we will first explain the evolution of some essential variables for
a single-technology firm.
A firm’s technological competitiveness TCi,Ψ (t) depends on the intrinsic quality
QΨ of the product technology it is applying and the total share ΓΨ of this
technology in the industry in the following way:
TCi,Ψ (t) = α ΓΨ (t)+ (1-α) QΨ (t), (1)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and Q0 ≤ QΨ ≤ 1. The parameter α is essential here, as it
determines the strength of the network externalities on the demand side. The
higher α, the more the total market share of a technology determines the firm’s
technological competitiveness.
Combining the organisational competitiveness λi with the technological
competitiveness TCi,Ψ (t) gives us the potential competitiveness PCi,Ψ (t) of a firm,
which is:
PCi,Ψ (t) = min { TCi,Ψ (t) ; λi }. (2)
Hence, a firm’s potential competitiveness is either bounded by its organisational
or its technological competitiveness. We could have modelled organisational and
technological competitiveness as (imperfect) substitutes, but this would have
implied that, e.g., a firm with a very low level of organisational competitiveness
may still survive as long as it has a high level of technological competitiveness.
We believe that such a situation is not realistic, as firms will always need a certain
level of organisational skills in order to manage the manufacturing and selling of
their products. Furthermore, by modelling organisational and technological
competitiveness as complementary, we exclude in advance the awkward
possibility that the organisational and technological skills of the firms will be
7negatively correlated in the simulation results.
Finally, a firm’s actual competitiveness Ci,Ψ (t) evolves according to the following
moving average process:
Ci,Ψ (t) = θ Ci,Ψ (t-1) + (1-θ) PCi,Ψ (t), (3)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, and Ci (t) = β2 λi for all firms that enter at period t. The system
parameter β2 puts an entrant at an initially disadvantageous and possibly even
dangerous position. To some extent such an entry process corresponds to
Jovanovic (1982). Even firms with very low competitiveness levels may decide to
enter the industry, simply because they do not know their true competitiveness
prior to their entry. Only by actually entering they can gather some evidence
regarding their real capabilities, which may subsequently eventuate in a rapid
exodus of entrants with low competitiveness levels. It is also consistent with the
empirical evidence on the entry process.6
Exit rules
If the actual competitiveness is below a certain fraction ΦL of the industry average
C , or if size drops below the minimum level sˆ , a firm dies with probability one,
a higher productivity level reduces the probability of exiting Pexit (t). Survival is
guaranteed for the next period if relative competitiveness exceeds an upper level
ΦH. Hence, we have
Pexit, i (t)  =  0 if Ci,Ψ (t) ≥ ΦH C (t) (4a)
Pexit, i (t)  =  
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Pexit, i (t)  =  1 if Ci,Ψ (t) ≤ ΦL C (t), or if si ≤ sˆ . (4c)
These exit rules can be interpreted as a mixture of voluntary and forced exit. If
relative competitiveness is lower than ΦL, or if their size drops below the
minimum level sˆ , firms go bankrupt and are thus forced to exit. However, for
those firms that observe that their relative competitiveness lies between ΦL and
ΦH, the exit decision is voluntary. Depending on their aspiration level, some of
them may decide to continue, whereas others may voluntarily leave the industry
and perhaps try their chances elsewhere.
Evolution of firm size
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 See Caves (1998) for an extensive overview.
8As mentioned before, all firms are initially endowed with a fixed size si. We
interpret this size as a firm’s sales capacity and assume for convenience that firms
always operate at full capacity. All surviving firms grow each period according to
a random process, however their mean growth rates asymptotically reach zero as
they mature. The process governing firm growth is
( )[ ]6)()(4 551)( )1( βχβ ββ +++=+ −− tataii ii eets
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where ai,t denotes the age of firm i at t. The variable χ is randomly drawn from a
normal distribution with mean µχ = 0 and variance σχ , β4 sets the average growth
rate of firms at the age of zero. This growth rate gradually declines as the firm
matures, a process of which the pace is determined by β5 . Finally, β6 assures that
even at a high age the size of a firm is still subject to random shocks.
Imitation
Until here, the description of the model has only considered firms employing one
product technology. But, as mentioned, the model also allows for firms employing
several technologies simultaneously. Let Ψ = A denote the firm’s intrinsically best
technology. As long as A < Κ, a firm may have the opportunity to imitate an
intrinsically better technology. Every period, firms randomly receive an imitation
draw according to a Poisson process7 with arrival rate ρim. Receiving an imitation
draw means that the firm acquires the knowledge of employing one intrinsically
better technology. This process is arranged such that on average a firm with a
given market share8 zi would receive ρim [zi + β7 (1-zi)] imitation draws in every β1
periods, where 0 ≤ β7 ≤ 1. The parameter β7 sets the inequality between firms with
different sizes with regard to receiving an imitation draw. If β7 = 1 all firms have
equal probabilities to imitate, if β7 = 0 the probability to imitate is proportional to
a firm’s market share.
If an imitation draw is received, the probability of acquiring the knowledge of
given other product technology is equal to 1 / (Κ − A).9 Every firm that has
obtained an opportunity reallocates every period a share ωi (t) of its total capacity
from its worst available technology Ψ = L (i.e., the technology with the lowest
technological competitiveness) to its best available technology Ψ = H (i.e., the
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 Again approximated by Bernoulli trials.
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 By market share we mean the firm’s share in the total capacity of the industry. Hence, we
have ∑=
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 The randomness of this process essentially reflects a bound to the agents’ rationality, combined
with some degree of technological uncertainty. Hence, the combination of these elements may lead
to erroneous decisions of firms with regard to the allocation of their imitation efforts.
9technology with the highest technological competitiveness).10 The size of this
reallocation share ωi (t) is determined by:
ωi (t) = β8 [TCi,H (t) − TCi,L (t)] (1 + η ), (6)
where β8 is a system parameter (0 ≤ β8 ≤ 1), and η is a random variable11 drawn
from a normal distribution with mean µη = 0 and variance ση . Hence, on average
the share that is reallocated increases with the difference in the technological
competitiveness between the worst and the best available product technology.
Whenever capacity is reallocated, part of it gets lost because of adjustment costs.
If we denote si,L as the capacity allocated to the worst product technology, si,H as
the capacity allocated to the best product technology, si as the total capacity of the
firm (i.e., ∑
=
H
L
is
ψ
ψ, ), and ∆si ( = si (t + 1) − si (t)) as the capacity growth of the firm,
we have:
si,H (t + 1) = si,H (t) +  β9 min {ωi (t) si (t); si,L (t)} + ∆si if ∆si > 0, (7a)
si,H (t + 1) = si,H (t) +  β9 max {ωi (t) si (t) ; si,L (t) + ∆si ; 0}
+ min { ∑−
=
1
,
H
L
is
ψ
ψ + ∆si ; 0} if ∆si  ≤ 0, (7b)
si,L (t + 1) = max { min { si,L (t) + ∆si − ωi (t) si (t); si,L (t) − ωi (t) si (t)} ; 0},
(8)
where 0 ≤ β9 ≤ 1. This parameter arranges the fraction of the transferred capacity
that gets lost whenever reallocated. Expression (7a) says that if the capacity of the
firm grows, it allocates first of all its growth to the best technology. Second, the
firm reallocates capacity from the worst technology according to the amount
determined by (6). If this amount is not available, it takes away all the capacity
that remained for the worst technology12, and adds it to the capacity of the best
technology.
Expression (7b) deals with cases of negative growth of total capacity. In such a
case the firm first withdraws the change in capital from the worst technology. If
that is not sufficient, it will subsequently take away capacity from the second
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 Please note that what we call here the ‘best’ technology is not necessarily the technology with
the highest intrinsic quality.
11
 Again, bounded rationality and technological uncertainty justify the randomness of this process.
12
 For simplicity, we assume that in such a case the firm, only in that period, does not consider
reallocation from the second worst to the best technology.
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worst, the third worst, et cetera. Only if even the capacity of the second best
technology H −1 is divested, the firm will necessarily have to withdraw the
remaining part of its total capacity decline ∆si from its best technology. If,
however, si,L (t) is still positive after subtracting (formally adding) ∆si , the firm
will reallocate again capacity from the worst to the best technology, possible
bounded by si,L (t) + ∆si . Expression (8) gives us the amount of capacity available
for the worst technology after having gone through the process of reallocation.
With regard to the competitiveness and survival probabilities, we in fact regard a
firm employing more than one product technology as a ‘mother’ firm consisting
of several subfirms, each of them employing one technology. The actual
competitiveness of each subfirm still evolves according to (3). Hence, the
organisational competitiveness of the mother firm still applies to all the subfirms.
Given the reallocation rules, it may happen therefore that a firm shifts part of its
capacity to a certain technology because of its higher technological
competitiveness, whereas the actual competitiveness derived from this technology
is still bounded by the organisational competitiveness. This can be justified in two
ways. First, we could argue that in this way a firm protects itself for the long run.
Somewhere in the future the technological competitiveness of the worst
technology may fall below the organisational competitiveness if new technologies
are introduced, in which case the technological competitiveness will be binding.
In order to avoid this a firm may decide already now to transfer some capacity to
the best technology. Second, we could assume that a firm only has fuzzy
information with regard to its competitiveness. For instance, it may erroneously
think it could perform better by switching to a better product technology.
When a firm is employing several technologies simultaneously, the actual
competitiveness of the whole firm i is the weighted average of the actual
competitiveness levels of all subfirms:
∑ 
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For the mother firm and all the subfirms the exit conditions expressed in (4)
apply. In case of exit the capacity of the subfirm is totally lost, or, in case the
mother firm dies, all capacity is gone.
It was already mentioned that every β1 periods a pioneering entrant or incumbent
introduces a completely new technology. When this happens, all technologies that
a given firm is employing drop one level in their intrinsic quality. Further, the
subfirm employing Ψ = 1 is merged with the subfirm employing the class of old
technologies Ψ = 0. Hence, in that period si,1 (t) is added to the capacity allocated
to Ψ = 0. With regard to the actual competitiveness of the subfirm employing
Ψ
 = 0 we calculate a size weighted average of the actual competitiveness levels of
11
the merging subfirms for that period. Since it is unlikely that, whenever a firm
imitates a product technology, it could immediately fully benefit from the imitated
technology, we let Ci,ψ (t) = β10 λi for all firms that imitate technology Ψ at t.
4. Simulation results
Similar to the notion of technological regimes, we introduce the notion of
technology adoption regimes to classify cases with different levels of
compatibility between old and new product technologies, and different degrees of
substitution between the quality and the network size of a technology. In contrast
with Shy (1996) however, our concept of compatibility between technologies is
not related to the notion of overlapping generations of users. In the interpretation
of our model, a consumer, repeatedly buying a given product, is more willing to
switch to a newer product technology if its compatibility with the old technology
is higher. To use again the example of sound recording media, a consumer that
wants to replace his old analogue cassette-player would be more willing to buy a
digital compact cassette (DCC) player than a CD-player, simply because his
previously recorded tapes can also be played on the DCC-player. Of course, in
real life there are many other considerations involved, but purely for the sake of
compatibility this consumer would switch easier to a DCC player than to a CD
player. Or let us consider a case in which a firm is considering to switch from a
manually operated lathe to a CNC operated one. If the CNC lathe requires worker
skills that are very different from the skills necessary for manually operated
lathes, the much more advanced CNC lathe is still lowly compatible with the old
fashioned manually controlled workbench, which could seriously hinder the
adoption of this new technology.
In the model, we will simulate different compatibility levels by varying the
differences in the intrinsic quality levels between succeeding product
technologies. High compatibility between a new and an old technology then
implies a high difference in their intrinsic quality levels. For simulating various
degrees of substitution between the quality and the network size of a technology,
we will of course use the parameter α, which sets the relative importance of a
technology’s share in the market.
We will simulate three different adoption regimes, in which the number of
product technologies available is equal to three (K = 3). The first one will be
labelled ‘quality regime’: in this regime, quality and network size are perfect
substitutes. This is arranged by setting parameter α equal to zero. Hence,
technological competitiveness is only determined by the intrinsic quality of a
technology. Further, in this regime new technologies are highly compatible with
old technologies. This situation is obtained by setting the intrinsic quality levels as
follows: Q3 = 1, Q2 = 0.5, and Q1 = 0.25.
The second technology adoption regime, labelled ‘intermediate regime’ is
12
characterised by again perfect substitutability of quality and network size, but here
new technologies are less compatible with old technologies than in the quality
regime. The lower compatibility of succeeding technologies is obtained by
decreasing the differences their intrinsic quality levels: Q3 = 1, Q2 = 0.75, and
Q1 = 0.5. Thus, compared to the quality regime, the second best technology is
more competitive vis-à-vis the best technology available.
The settings of the third adoption regime (the ‘network’ regime) are such that
quality and network size are to some extent complementary α = 0.5. Further,
Q3 = 1, Q2 = 0.75, and Q1 = 0.5. Under this regime, the market share of a
technology determines technological competitiveness as well. The other
parameters remain constant across the three technology adoption regimes.13
Although the three adoption regimes we analyse here are not perfectly consistent
with the cases described by Shy (1996), we can still base our expectations with
regard to the outcomes of the simulations on the predictions of his model.
According to Shy (1996), whenever new technologies are perfectly compatible
with old technologies, the new technologies are adopted each period. Further, a
decrease in the degree of compatibility between new and old technologies would
increase the duration of each technology. Based on this, we may expect that the
duration of a technology is higher in the intermediate regime than in the quality
regime.
Further, Shy (1996) concludes that when newer technologies are not perfectly
compatible with older technologies, new technologies are never adopted if
consumers treat network size and technological advance as perfect complements,
but may be adopted if they are treated as perfect substitutes. Therefore, we may
expect from our simulations that duration will be highest under the network
regime, although eventually newer technologies will be adopted, given that our
parameters are not consistent with perfect complementarity between network size
and quality.14 Finally, we may expect to see that not always new technologies are
adopted whenever they appear in both the quality and, more likely, in the
intermediate regime. In both these regimes there is perfect substitutability
between quality and network size and imperfect compatibility. However, Shy’s
result (of technologies being skipped occasionally under these conditions) very
much relies on his notion of compatibility. Therefore, some scepticism with
regard to this expectation is appropriate.
Graphs 1a  to 1c show the evolution of the market share of successive product
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 The values of the other parameters are: N (0) = 40, ρE = 0.15, µλ = 1, σλ = 0.1, si = 250, β1 =
500, Q0 = 0, θ = 0.99, β2 = 0.6, ΦL = 0.6 , ΦH = 1, sˆ = 25, β3 = 10, β4 = 0.01, β5 = 0.0069, σχ =
0.1, β6 = 0.01, ρim = 20, β7 = 0.1, β8 = 0.1, ση = 0.5, β9 = 0.05, and β10 = 0.8. The results of the
simulations are robust to small changes in the levels of all parameters.
14
 However, when α  is set equal to one, the simulations of our model indeed show that new
technologies are never adopted.
13
technologies for the three adoption regimes, resulting from one simulation run of
5000 periods.
Graph 1: Market shares of successive product technologies
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As graph 1a shows, in the quality regime technologies have a rather short life.
Whenever a new technology is introduced, it quickly replaces the previous
technology and starts to dominate the market until again a new technology
becomes available. In the intermediate regime, the replacement process is much
slower, implying a longer duration of technologies (see graph 1b). The last graph
shows that, after a very short period of coexistence, one technology always
14
dominates the market until it becomes obsolete15, after which it is quickly
replaced by a new technology that again dominates until its obsolescence. Thus,
the outcomes of the simulations are fairly comparable to Shy’s predictions. The
duration of technologies is higher when compatibility between new and old
technologies is lower. However, both under the quality regime as well under the
intermediate regime, new technologies are always adopted.16 Only under the
network regime new technologies are never adopted until the existing dominant
technology has become obsolete.
Graph 2: Number of firms
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 I.e., until it becomes part of the class of old technologies.
16
 As mentioned before, this is due to the different notion of compatibility in Shy (1996).
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Graph 3: Herfindahl index
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How do the populations of firms evolve under these different regimes, and are
there significant differences between the regimes? Graphs 2 and 3 show the
evolution of the number of firms and the concentration levels. Under the quality
regime, we observe a gradually declining number of firms and increasing
concentration levels. The intermediate regime exhibits a gradually growing
population of firms with decreasing concentration levels. Finally, under the
network regime we see on average a growing population of firms, however the
growth rates fluctuates considerably. Further, new technology adoptions in the
16
network regime are associated with a sharp decrease in the number of firms.
These graphs, derived from one simulation run for each regime, indeed  show that
the regimes differ with regard to the population dynamics. But for a better
assessment of the significance of these differences we calculated a number of
statistics on the basis of the output of ten runs per regime17, shown by table 1.
The first two rows show the average number of firms and the average Herfindahl-
index.18 Next, we calculated the average number of entrants over 50 periods.19
Entrants are defined as firms absent at the beginning of a 50-period era, but
present at the end of the era (vice versa for exiters); incumbents are firms present
throughout the sample period. Further, we calculated survival rates for entrants,
both for the short-run (i.e., the proportion of entrants that survive at least 50
periods) as well as for the long run (proportion of entrants surviving at least 500
periods).  Finally, we calculated the weighted20 average age of all exiting firms at
their year of exit, and the average age of all firms at t = 5000. Table 1 shows the
averages of these variables per regime over all the sample periods of the ten
simulations (standard error of the mean in parentheses).
Table 1 Quality regime Intermediate regime Network regime
Number of firms 21.2 (1.27) 56.1 (2.34) 66.3 (1.70)
Herfindahl-index 12.5 (1.58) 3.57 (0.25) 3.44 (0.22)
Number of entrants over
50 periods 1.24 (0.08) 1.26 (0.06) 2.75 (0.05)
Survival rates
-short-run 43.9 (1.62) 52.1 (0.99) 49.8 (1.12)
-long-run 31.6 (1.74) 43.9 (0.78) 30.5 (0.63)
Mean age of
- all exiters 913 (32.8) 1176 (53.3) 840 (41.3)
- all firms at t = 5000 1852 (177) 2937 (67.6) 2374 (118)
On average, the largest number of firms is found in the network regime, whereas
the quality regime exhibits the smallest population. Not surprisingly then, the
highest concentration levels are found under the quality regime, whereas the
network regime produces the lowest concentration levels.
The highest number of entrants emerges under the network regime, which is
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 In order to keep the datasets at a reasonable size we have sampled each run only every 50
periods.
18
 The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of squared market shares.
19
 We did not calculate entry and exit rates, because they would not reflect real differences in, e.g.,
the ease of entry. If a regime is conducive to entrants the simulation results will show a higher
number of firms in time than for a regime less conducive to entrants. Since the expected number of
entrants in each period is fixed by the arrival rate ρE and identical across the three regimes, the
entry conducive regime will show lower entry rates than the regime less conducive to entrants.
20
 For the weights we use the size of a firm (si in the model).
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approximately twice as high as under the other regimes.21 Concerning the survival
rates, we see that the intermediate regime produces the highest probability for
entrants to survive, both for the short run as well as the long run. The lowest
short-run survival rates emerge under the quality regime. Long-run survival rates
for the quality and the network regime are virtually similar.
The average age of exiting firms is highest under the intermediate regime, and
lowest under the network regime. Further, at the end of the simulation the oldest
population is found under the intermediate regime, whereas the youngest
population is found under the quality regime.
With regard to the consistency of the model with the stylised facts mentioned in
section two, it is obvious that the model reproduces the first one. Under all
regimes, there is persistent market turbulence due to entry, and exit. The second
stylised fact (high infant mortality, negatively correlated with firm age) also
emerges, except for the quality regime. Graph 4 shows the probability of exiting
over the full simulation period given the age cohort22 of an entrant for each
regime.
Graph 4: hazard rate as a function of age
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Under the quality regime, infant mortality initially declines with age, however no
entrant is able to live for more than approximately 4,500 periods. This leads to a
rise in hazard rates for entrants with ages exceeding 4,000 periods. The other two
regimes show very similar hazard rates that indeed decline as entrants mature.
Hence, both the intermediate regime and the network regime reproduce this
second stylised fact.
The third stylised fact (growth rates of firms that fall with age and with size) is of
course to some extent imposed on the model by equation (5). Still, it might be
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 Note that we only sample every 50 periods. Therefore, despite the identical entry arrival rate of
0.15 per period, the three regimes produce different numbers of entrants due to variations in the
number of firms that die before being observed in the sample. Hence, this number can be
interpreted as a ‘very short run’ survival rate.
22
 Each age cohort covers 50 simulation periods.
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interesting to learn about the emerging econometric regularities of the model. As
in Dosi et al. (1995), we therefore run a number of regressions of the following
form:
( ))(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)(
)(ln 3210 tatsqtaqtsqqts
Tts
iiii
i
i +++=


 +
, (10)
for t = 50, 100, …, 5000 and T = 50 (regression 10a), and for t = 500, 1000, …,
5000 and T = 500 (regression 10b). The results are listed in table 2.
Table 2 q0 q1 q2 q3 R2-adjusted
Quality regime
10a 0.595 -0.045 -0.085 0.006 0.098
10b 1.306 -0.135* -0.202 0.020* 0.036
Intermediate regime
10a 0.595 -0.055 -0.077 0.007 0.119
10b 1.128 -0.099 -0.151 0.012 0.170
Network regime
10a 0.641 -0.058 -0.086 0.008 0.101
10b 1.707 -0.146 -0.235 0.020 0.204
Under all regimes this stylised fact is reproduced. All parameter estimates are
significant at the 1-% level, except for the ones indicated with an asterisk, which
are only significant at the 10-% level. Hence, both over the 50 period interval as
well as over the 500 periods, initial size and initial age exert a negative impact on
firm growth. Surprisingly, the interaction term exhibits in all cases a positive
coefficient. Apparently the negative effect of, for instance, age on firm growth is
attenuated for larger firms. Given the specification of equation (5), this emergent
property is hard to explain. However, this regularity has been observed before in
empirical studies on firm growth. Also Evans (1987a, 1987b) found significant
positive estimates for the variable indicating the interaction between age and size.
Persistence of asymmetric performances, the fourth stylised fact, also emerges
from the model. To show this, we calculated for each 50th period the standard
deviation of the mean of relative competitiveness of all firms (i.e., relative to the
industry mean). These series are plotted in graph 5. As this graph shows, there is
no convergence in the relative competitiveness of firms, hence in all regimes
asymmetric performances are persistent. Especially under the quality regime the
standard deviation clearly exhibits cyclical fluctuations, associated with the high
speed of adoption of new technologies.
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Graph 5: standard deviation of average relative competitiveness
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The evidence for the last stylised fact mentioned in section two, regarding the
skewed and stable size distributions, is shown by graphs 6a to 6c. These graphs
plot the log of firm sizes si (t) on the vertical axis and the log of the firms’ ranks
ranki (t) on the horizontal axis (firms are ranked according to their size, in
descending order) for t = 500, 1000,…5000 for the same simulation run
underlying graph 1a to 1c.
As graphs 6a to 6c show, all three regimes produce skew firm size distributions,
but there are some interesting differences. The quality regime seems to produce
the most skewed distribution, whereas the least stable size distribution emerges
under the intermediate regime. These findings, derived from visual inspection, are
corroborated by the results from running the following regression:
  ln si (t) = A + B ln ranki (t) , (11)
for t = 250, 750, …, 4750 (regression 11a), and for t = 500, 1000,…,5000
(regression 11b) over all simulation runs. Table 3 shows the results (all parameter
estimates are significant at the 1-% level).
Table 3 A B R2-adjusted
Quality regime
11a 10.4 -0.93 0.84
11b 10.5 -0.90 0.83
Intermediate regime
11a 10.7 -0.80 0.79
11b 10.8 -0.81 0.80
Network regime
11a 10.9 -0.80 0.75
11b 11.0 -0.82 0.77
Indeed, the quality regime shows the highest absolute value for B, and hence
produces the most skewed size distribution. Further, we observe that it hardly
matters when the regressions are executed (i.e., either at the end of a depreciation
period or in the middle of it), indicating the stability of the size distribution.
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Graph 6: Size distributions
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In conclusion, the simulations of the three technology adoption regimes show
significant cross-sectional differences with regard to the static and dynamic
properties of the firm population. The quality regime produces the smallest and
youngest population of firms, whereas long run survival seems to be easiest under
the intermediate regime. Still, because of a higher number of entrants, the largest
firm population emerges under the network regime. Hence, these results strongly
suggest a relationship between the timing and frequency of new technology
21
adoptions and the dynamics of the firm population. Also, the model is consistent
with a number of stylised facts observed in the empirical literature.
5. Interaction between adoption regimes and technological
regimes
As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this paper was to introduce demand
side considerations as an alternative to more supply side oriented explanations for
industrial dynamics, like the concept of technological regimes. By varying a
number of parameters determining the technological competitiveness of firms, we
have designed three technology adoption regimes and investigated the differences
in the firm population between these regimes. However, to some extent our model
also allows  for investigating the impact of different technological regimes on the
industrial dynamics, and the interaction between adoption regimes and
technological regimes. The present section will deal with these issues. By
selecting and varying a number of parameters reflecting the level of
cumulativeness and spillovers, we will run and compare several simulations of
different technological regimes under the three technology adoption regimes.
A technological regime can broadly be defined as a particular combination of
cumulativeness and spillover conditions, common to specific activities of
innovation and production and shared by the population of firms undertaking
those activities. Cumulativeness conditions refer to the extent to which acquiring
technological knowledge is a cumulative process, whereas spillover conditions
reflect the ease of technological knowledge to flow from innovators to imitators.
In the literature on technological regimes, a distinction is usually made between
two major patterns on innovative activities. The first one, called Schumpeter Mark
I (SM-I), is characterised by a key role played by new firms in innovative
activities, whereas in the second one, Schumpeter Mark II (SM-II), this key role is
fulfilled by the large and established firms.
The differences between the two regimes are mainly related to differences in the
cumulativeness and spillover conditions. For instance, the SM-I regime is
characterised by low levels of cumulativeness and high levels of spillover effects,
whereas opposite conditions hold for the SM-II regime. Given these differences,
industries with different underlying technological regimes are likely to differ with
respect to their dynamic and structural properties. In SM-I industries, we may
expect a turbulent and large population of young and small firms, and low entry
barriers. SM-II industries may be characterised by a more stable and small
population of large and old firms, and by high entry barriers.
Obviously, the conditions determining the technological regime have a strong
impact on the patterns of innovative activities of an industry, as well as on the
ease and the impact of imitation. Since in our model innovation is exogenous, we
cannot fully simulate the different conditions underlying technological regimes.
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Only to the extent that these conditions apply to ease and impact of imitation we
can analyse the effect of different technological regimes in our model.
To investigate whether our model is still able to produce the regularities predicted
by the technological regime framework, we first have to identify the parameters
reflecting the cumulativeness and spillover conditions. For cumulativeness we
have to find the variable that indicates best to what extent the acquisition of
knowledge is a cumulative process. We propose to vary the parameter governing
the ‘penalty’ rates for continuing firms (β10). This penalty rate can be interpreted
as a measure indicating to what extent the knowledge and experiences of a firm
with its existing product technologies carry over to the new technology it adopts.
For instance, if β10 is equal to β2 (the penalty rate for entrants), the subfirm
adopting the new technology starts at a competitiveness level equal to that of an
entrant.23 In this case the subfirm has no direct advantage over entrants with
regard to the new technology (the accumulated experience with its existing
technologies does not carry over to the subfirm with the new technology).
However, the higher β10 (relative to β2), the more the knowledge of new
technology is based on the knowledge of previous technologies, and hence the
more a new subfirm benefits from its accumulated experience vis-à-vis new firms
entering with the same technology.24
For varying the spillover effects, it seems natural to vary the parameter
determining the probability to receive an imitation draw (i.e., ρim). Since we have
defined imitating as acquiring the knowledge of applying a superior technology,
this parameter reflects the ease of knowledge of new product technologies to flow
to imitators. However, this parameter only reflects spillovers between continuing
firms, not from continuing firms to entrants. Of course, in a strict sense, entrants
are considered as continuing firms in the model from the moment they have
entered. Thus, when the arrival rate of imitations is higher, also the very young
firms have a higher probability to receive an imitation draw. On the other hand,
since more continuing firms will imitate, the average competitiveness level will be
higher, which decreases the probability for entrants to survive. Several simulation
runs with different imitation arrival rates indeed show that this last effect
dominates: higher levels of spillovers generally lead to less entry, ceteris paribus.
Since this inconsistency is due to the fact that entrants do not directly benefit from
higher spillover levels, we consider it appropriate to also increase the arrival rate
of entrants (ρent) when spillovers levels are higher. In that case, more entrants
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 I.e., relative to the firms’ genotype organisational competitiveness levels λi.
24
 Of course, it may happen occasionally that an entrant with a certain technology receives an
imitation draw quickly after it has entered. If β10 is high, this entrant will also benefit from its
experience with the inferior technology, despite the short time it has been employing it. This will
not seriously effect the results however, because the overall competitiveness of this entrant is at
least for some time also determined by the competitiveness of the subfirm employing the inferior
technology for which the entry penalty rate β2 is still effective. Besides that, this firm already
employed the initial technology successfully and therefore must possess some crucial knowledge
about it.
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have access to the knowledge necessary to imitate an existing technology. Also
the entering firms will then benefit directly from high spillover conditions.
In the next experiments we will consider three levels of cumulativeness and
spillover conditions (low, medium, high) for each of the technology adoption
regimes of the previous section. The specific parameter settings are as follows.
Low cumulativeness means no direct advantage for subfirms relative to entrants
(β10 =β2 =0.6). Medium levels correspond to the parameter settings of the
previous section (β10 = 0.8), whereas high cumulativeness levels are set by β10 =
1. With regard to spillover effects, low levels of spillovers are set by ρI = 10 and
(ρent) = 0.1. Medium levels again correspond to the parameter settings of the
previous section (hence, ρI = 20 and ρent = 0.15). High spillover conditions are set
by ρI = 30 and ρent = 0.2.
Hence, for each adoption regime we will consider nine different combinations of
cumulativeness and spillover conditions. To get a general impression of the effect
of varying the cumulativeness and spillover conditions, tables 4 to 9 will show the
means and their standard errors of the same variables listed in table one under
these various conditions (except for the number of entrants).25 For an assessment
of the significance of the effects of different cumulativeness and spillover
conditions, and to investigate the extent to which these conditions interact, we will
additionally perform the following regression analyses. Each of the six variables
will be regressed on a number of dummy variables, indicating the various
cumulativeness and spillover conditions and the potential interaction between
them. More specific, for each adoption regime we will estimate the following
equation:
Y = β1 + β2 Cm_l + β3 Cm_h + β4 Sp_l + β5 Sp_h + β6 (Cm_l x Sp_l) +
      β7 (Cm_l x Sp_h) + β8 (Cm_h x Sp_l)  + β9 (Cm_h x Sp_h) + ε , (12)
where Y is the dependent variable under consideration, Cm_l equals one if
cumulativeness conditions are low and zero otherwise, Cm_h equals one if
cumulativeness is high and zero otherwise, Sp_l equals one if spillover conditions
are low and zero otherwise, and Sp_h equals one if spillovers are high and zero
otherwise. From this configuration of dummy variables it follows that the
technological regime with medium cumulativeness and spillover conditions will
be the reference regime, implying that the estimates for β1 will be equal to the
means of the variables listed in table 1. The regression statistics can be found in
table A to C in the Appendix of this paper.
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 We will not display the evolution of market shares of succeeding technologies for the different
technological regime conditions, because these patterns hardly show any differences within each
technology adoption regime.
24
Based on the technological regime framework, we would expect that, ceteris
paribus, higher cumulativeness conditions generate a lower number of firms and
higher concentration levels, lower survival rates and relatively young exiting
firms, leading ultimately to an older population of firms. With regard to spillover
conditions we would generally expect opposite regularities to emerge from the
simulation. We have no clear expectations regarding the signs of the interaction
effects. As mentioned, in the literature on technological regimes often a
distinction is made between two regimes (Schumpeter I vs. II) with opposite
spillover and cumulativeness conditions. However, no explicit reference is made
regarding the interaction between them. By impeding the persistence of
monopolistic advantages, high spillover conditions hinder innovative firms to
become large, whereas low cumulativeness conditions facilitates innovative entry
(compared to high cumulativeness conditions). Therefore, both high spillovers
and low cumulativeness independently impose restrains on concentration levels.
To what extent these conditions reinforce each other is unclear, however.
Studying the significance of the interaction between the spillover and
cumulativeness dummies may partly illuminate this issue.
Table 4: Mean number of firms (standard error)
Quality regime Intermediate regime Network regime
Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h
Cm_l 22.4
(1.20)
34.4
(1.05)
48.6
(1.53)
Cm_l 51.2
(1.50)
67.6
(3.17)
83.2
(3.38)
Cm_l 46.5
(2.68)
63.0
(1.53)
87.8
(2.89)
Cm_m 17.2
(0.70)
21.2
(1.27)
30.8
(1.15)
Cm_m 40.4
(2.04)
56.1
(2.34)
72.1
(2.39)
Cm_m 48.5
(2.24)
66.3
(1.70)
84.4
(3.91)
Cm_h 10.2
(0.88)
12.1
(1.33)
16.0
(0.74)
Cm_h 31.1
(1.29)
36.8
(1.36)
42.6
(2.09)
Cm_h 39.9
(2.79)
49.2
(1.74)
71.3
(3.78)
Table 5: Mean Herfindahl index (standard error)
Quality regime Intermediate regime Network regime
Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h
Cm_l 10.1
(0.79)
6.13
(0.44)
4.64
(0.37)
Cm_l 4.50
(0.44)
3.62
(0.25)
2.97
(0.12)
Cm_l 5.37
(0.54)
3.53
(0.17)
2.77
(0.28)
Cm_m 12.6
(0.97)
12.5
(1.58)
7.70
(1.15)
Cm_m 5.23
(0.48)
3.57
(0.25)
2.90
(0.26)
Cm_m 4.89
(0.41)
3.44
(0.22)
2.99
(0.20)
Cm_h 31.2
(5.61)
23.4
(3.38)
14.9
(1.58)
Cm_h 6.37
(0.28)
5.29
(0.38)
4.89
(0.37)
Cm_h 5.72
(0.67)
4.89
(0.39)
3.39
(0.26)
As expected, in all three technology adoption regimes we see that, ceteris paribus,
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higher spillover conditions lead to a higher number of firms and to lower
concentration levels. Also, with regard to cumulativeness conditions, we see that
in general the number of firms decreases and the concentration increases with
higher cumulativeness. Only under the network regime there is no clear
relationship between cumulativeness on the one hand and the number of firms and
concentration levels on the other.
The regression analyses show that with regard to the number of firms the
differences due to variations in the technological regime parameters are
significant. Only under the network regime the dummy for lower cumulativeness
is not statistically significant. Interesting differences emerge with regard to the
interaction effects. Under the quality regime, the combination of low
cumulativeness and low spillovers significantly decreases the number of firms.
Thus the positive effect of lower cumulativeness on the number of firms is almost
completely offset by the negative effect of lower spillovers under this regime. In
the opposite case, the negative effect of higher cumulativeness is again offset by
the positive effect of high spillovers, but here the former effect dominates.
In cases with opposite spillover and cumulativeness conditions, we observe that
the dummy for low cumulativeness and high spillover is significantly positive:
low cumulativeness and high spillovers reinforce each other in this case.
However, no significant interaction emerges in the opposite scenario, i.e., no
significant interaction is observed between high cumulativeness and low
spillovers under the quality regime. Under the intermediate regime, this latter
interaction is significantly positive. Here, high spillovers and low cumulativeness
together result in a higher number of firms than would be expected on the basis of
these two effects individually. The other significant interaction under the
intermediate regime emerges with high spillover and high cumulativeness. As
under the quality regime, the negative effect of higher cumulativeness is again
offset by the positive effect of high spillovers, where the former effect dominates.
Finally, under the network regime no significant interaction is observed between
cumulativeness and spillovers.
With regard to concentration levels the dummies for lower cumulativeness and
higher spillovers are insignificant across all adoption regimes. Further, the dummy
for low spillovers is insignificant under the quality regime, but significant under
the other regimes. Finally, none of the dummies covering the interaction effects is
statistically significant under any of the three adoption regimes. Thus,
concentration levels are less affected by varying the cumulativeness and spillover
conditions than the total number of firms, indicating that most of the differences
appear in the lower firm size classes.
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Table 6: Mean short run survival rates (standard error)
Quality regime Intermediate regime Network regime
Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h
Cm_l 50.1
(1.46)
49.6
(1.39)
46.5
(1.70)
Cm_l 62.6
(0.77)
56.0
(1.34)
52.1
(1.83)
Cm_l 54.1
(1.70)
49.6
(0.81)
49.4
(0.97)
Cm_m 48.5
(1.54)
43.9
(1.62)
42.0
(1.22)
Cm_m 61.6
(2.37)
52.1
(0.99)
47.8
(1.58)
Cm_m 54.9
(1.81)
49.8
(1.12)
49.6
(0.60)
Cm_h 36.6
(3.01)
30.7
(4.54)
30.0
(0.95)
Cm_h 52.0
(2.02)
34.5
(1.96)
28.2
(2.45)
Cm_h 50.4
(1.54)
45.4
(1.91)
46.9
(1.21)
With respect to short run survival rates, the relationship between cumulativeness
and this variable is as expected, albeit rather weak under the network regime:
higher cumulativeness is generally associated with lower short run survival.
However, higher spillover levels lead to lower short run survival rates (again a
rather weak effect under the network regime). Still, this is not surprising, since
high spillovers increase the industrial average competitiveness, making it harder
for entrants to survive.
The regression analyses generally confirm this. Compared to the technological
regime with medium cumulativeness and spillover levels, higher cumulativeness
significantly decrease the short run survival rates. Further, lower spillovers
significantly increase the short run survival, except under the quality regime. The
dummies for low cumulativeness and high spillovers are all statistically
insignificant. Finally, only one interaction dummy is significant. Under the
intermediate regime, the negative effect of high cumulativeness on short run
survival is almost completely offset by the (unexpected) positive effect of low
spillovers.
Table 7: Mean long run survival rates (standard error)
Quality regime Intermediate regime Network regime
Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h
Cm_l 31.0
(1.11)
33.2
(1.31)
34.1
(1.22)
Cm_l 46.4
(1.30)
44.8
(1.77)
44.3
(1.83)
Cm_l 29.6
(1.32)
29.4
(0.98)
31.0
(1.06)
Cm_m 29.6
(1.41)
31.6
(1.74)
29.3
(1.63)
Cm_m 50.1
(2.02)
43.9
(0.78)
41.3
(1.55)
Cm_m 30.6
(2.06)
30.5
(0.63)
31.3
(1.30)
Cm_h 25.0
(1.77)
23.2
(3.60)
23.6
(1.50)
Cm_h 42.4
(1.63)
30.9
(2.20)
23.7
(2.12)
Cm_h 29.2
(1.73)
27.7
(1.48)
30.2
(1.48)
For long run survival rates, the picture is rather similar with regard to
cumulativeness conditions. Under the quality and the intermediate regime, higher
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cumulativeness decreases long run survival, whereas long run survival under the
network regime is not effected by different cumulativeness conditions. Higher
spillover conditions only seem to have a (negative) effect on long run survival
under the intermediate regime.
Again, these observations are confirmed by the regression analyses. Under the
network regime, none of the dummies is statistically significant, whereas under
the quality regime only the dummy for high cumulativeness is significant. Further,
under the intermediate regime the dummies for low spillovers (positive) and high
cumulativeness (positive) show significant estimates. Finally, all interaction
effects are statistically insignificant under all three adoption regimes.
Table 8: Mean age of exiters (standard error)
Quality regime Intermediate regime Network regime
Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h
Cm_l 676
(21.2)
759
(17.8)
834
(23.3)
Cm_l 1039
(37.2)
819
(28.1)
444
(24.3)
Cm_l 874
(42.2)
883
(25.8)
814
(39.6)
Cm_m 666
(25.7)
913
(32.8)
890
(35.6)
Cm_m 1297
(43.4)
1176
(53.3)
682
(75.6)
Cm_m 759
(32.3)
840
(41.3)
755
(35.2)
Cm_h 659
(37.0)
745
(51.3)
861
(27.1)
Cm_h 1224
(45.8)
1232
(58.5)
612
(84.1)
Cm_h 699
(34.2)
653
(24.2)
559
(34.9)
For the mean age of exiting firms, the picture is quite diverse. Under the quality
regime, higher spillovers tend to increase the average age of exiters (as expected),
whereas under the intermediate regime the opposite tendency is observed. No
clear relationship between spillover levels and the mean age of exiters emerges
under the network regime. With regard to cumulativeness, only the regularities
under the network regime match our expectations. Here, higher cumulativeness
decreases the average age of exiters. This relationship seems to be reversed under
the intermediate regime, whereas no clear effects of cumulativeness conditions are
observed under the quality regime.
Naturally, the regression statistics show a dispersed picture too, most notably for
the quality regime. Both the dummies for low and high cumulativeness are
statistically significant, with both being negative. Also the dummy for low
spillovers is significant under this regime, with the expected negative sign. Under
the intermediate regime, both the dummies for low cumulativeness and high
spillover are significant, but both have a negative sign where we would expect
positive ones. Finally, under the network regime the dummy for high
cumulativeness and the dummy for low spillovers are significant, with the
expected negative sign. Regarding the interaction effects, it is interesting to see
that only under the quality regime significant interactions emerge, where the
combined effects seem to be less strong than the sum of individual effects. This
applies to the combinations of low spillovers and low cumulativeness, low
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spillovers and high cumulativeness, and high spillovers and high cumulativeness.
Table 9: Mean age at t = 5000 (standard error)
Quality regime Intermediate regime Network regime
Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h Sp_l Sp_m Sp_h
Cm_l 1298
(82.3)
1444
(81.5)
1682
(75.5)
Cm_l 1938
(59.8)
2029
(58.4)
2316
(75.6)
Cm_l 2055
(109)
2234
(68.8)
2359
(85.3)
Cm_m 1281
(122)
1852
(177)
2024
(132)
Cm_m 2275
(37.3)
2937
(67.6)
3294
(47.3)
Cm_m 2253
(174)
2374
(118)
2522
(56.4)
Cm_h 2112
(424)
2717
(390)
2365
(183)
Cm_h 2768
(157)
3827
(129)
4098
(120)
Cm_h 2067
(72.9)
2438
(122)
2385
(116)
The average age of the total population at the ultimate period (table 9) generally
increases with cumulativeness and spillover conditions under the intermediate
regime and, to a lesser extent, under the quality regime, whereas no relationships
emerge under the network regime.
Also the regression statistics show no significant dummies for the network
regime. For the quality regime, only the dummy for high cumulativeness is
statistically significant. The dummies for cumulativeness have the expected sign
and are both significant under the intermediate regime. The dummies for spillover
conditions are also statistically significant, however their signs do not match the
expectations based on the technological regime framework.
Interaction effects are only significant under the intermediate regime this time.
The (expected) negative effect of low cumulativeness combined with the
(unexpected) negative effect of low spillovers results in an older population than
we would expect from those two effects individually. The positive effect of high
cumulativeness on the average age of the total population is more than offset by
the negative effect of low spillovers when these are combined.
In conclusion, we observe that with regard to the cumulativeness conditions the
regularities predicted by the technological regime framework are reproduced by
the model. In general, we see a smaller, more concentrated and eventually older
population of firms when cumulativeness conditions are high. Spillover conditions
are in line with the expectations regarding the number of firms and concentration
levels. I.e., higher spillovers lead to a higher number of firms and to lower
concentration levels. However, they do not increase survival rates or decrease the
average age of the population.
A possible explanation for this is that the benefits of the incumbents from high
spillovers are such that they easily imitate and survive, thereby increasing the
industrial average competitiveness. This process leads both to an eventually older
population, as well as to hard survival conditions for entrants. Another reason for
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this inconsistency with the technological regime framework is that our model does
not allow for analysing the effect of the technological regime conditions on
differences between the innovative activities of incumbents and entrants.
Innovation is exogenous in our model, and perhaps endogenising the innovation
process would make our model more consistent with the technological regime
framework.
Finally, we observe that the regularities emerging under the network regime are
the least affected by variations in spillover and cumulativeness conditions. Also
the interaction effects between spillovers and cumulativeness are never significant
under the network regime. Apparently, the emerging regularities under this regime
are mainly determined by the network externalities among users and the resulting
diffusion patterns of new product technologies. Under the quality and
intermediate regime, we have found some significant interaction effects, however
they do not appear to systematically affect the results.
6. Conclusions
This paper has shown that sectoral variations in the dynamics of the firm
population can be explained by differences in the timing and frequency of new
product technology adoptions. Assuming that varying consumer preferences over
technology advance and network size effects, and different degrees of
compatibility between succeeding technologies explain why in some industries
technologies are more often replaced than in others (see Shy, 1996), we analysed,
by means of a simulation model, how the different replacement patterns would
effect the dynamics of the firm population. We designed and investigated three
different technology adoption regimes with the following underlying conditions:
(i) a quality regime, in which quality and network size are regarded as perfect
substitutes and new product technologies are highly compatible with old
technologies, (ii) an intermediate regime, in which new product technologies are
less compatible with old technologies, but where quality and network size are still
regarded as perfect substitutes, and (iii) a network regime, in which network size
and quality are regarded as complementary. By modelling the growth of a firm’s
competitiveness as a function of both the quality level and the market share of the
product technology it employs, and by tuning the parameters of this function to
arrange the adoption regimes, the model produces the following results.
First of all, three rather different replacement patterns of technologies emerge. In
the quality regime, technologies are continuously and rather quickly replaced by
superior technologies as soon as they become available. In the intermediate
regime, newer technologies still always replace older ones, but the duration of a
technology is higher than under the quality regime. Finally, in the network regime
eventually one technology always dominates the market until it becomes obsolete
(despite the presence of superior technologies), after which it is quickly replaced
by a new technology that again dominates until its obsolescence.
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The second result is that the replacement patterns of product technologies clearly
affect the dynamics of the firm population. The quality regime produces the
smallest, but most dynamic population of firms, whereas the largest firm
population emerges under the network regime. The intermediate regime exhibits
the most stable population of firms, where long run survival is relatively easy.
The third result is that for all three regimes the model is able to reproduce a
number of important stylised facts from industrial organisation. The model
produces persistence of market turbulence due to entry and exit; high infant
mortality, negatively correlated with firm age; growth rates of firms that fall with
age and with size; persistence of asymmetric performances; and skewed and
relatively stable size distributions.
The fourth result is that all these outcomes are obtained in the absence of
replicator dynamics. There is no explicit relationship in our model between a
firm’s relative competitiveness and its growth rate. The only selection mechanism
in our model is that a minimum level of relative competitiveness is required in
order to survive. This rather simple mechanism turns out to be sufficient to
produce meaningful results, consistent with the previously mentioned stylised
facts.
The fifth and final result is derived from running the model under different
technological regimes, represented by various cumulativeness and spillover
conditions. In general, we see a smaller, more concentrated and eventually older
population of firms when cumulativeness conditions are high. These regularities
are in line with the technological regime framework. Spillover conditions,
however, are only partly consistent with this framework. Higher spillovers indeed
lead to a higher number of firms and lower concentration levels. However, they
do not generally increase survival rates or decrease the average age of the
population. The explanation for this is found in the trivial effect of high spillover
conditions on the competitiveness of incumbent firms vis-à-vis entrants. High
spillover conditions enable more continuing firms to imitate, which increases the
industrial average competitiveness. This, in turn, deteriorates the general
conditions for entrants and makes it more difficult for them to survive. Finally, we
observed that the regularities emerging under the network regime are the least
affected by varying cumulativeness and spillover conditions.
Endogenising the innovation process could make our model more consistent with
the technological regime framework. Since innovation is exogenous in our model,
we cannot analyse the effect of the technological regime conditions on differences
between the innovative activities of incumbents and entrants. Perhaps future
efforts in this direction will enable us to better assess the interaction between the
demand side oriented adoption regimes and the more supply side oriented
technological regimes.
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Appendix: regression statistics section 4
Table A Number of firms Herfindahl-index
Quality
regime
Intermediate
regime
Network
regime
Quality
regime
Intermediate
regime
Network
regime
Constant 21.2**
(18.8)
56.1**
(24.6)
66.3**
(24.4)
12.5**
(5.32)
3.57**
(10.8)
3.44**
(8.96)
Cm_l 13.2**
(8.32)
11.5**
(3.58)
-3.36
(-0.88)
-6.42
(-1.93)
0.05
(0.11)
0.09
(0.17)
Cm_h -9.02**
(-5.67)
-19.3**
(-5.96)
-17.1**
(-4.46)
10.9**
(3.26)
1.72**
(3.66)
1.44**
(2.66)
Sp_l -4.02**
(-2.53)
-15.7**
(-4.86)
-17.8**
(-4.65)
0.06
(0.02)
1.66**
(3.54)
1.45**
(2.66)
Sp_h 9.60**
(6.03)
16.0**
(4.96)
18.1**
(4.72)
-4.87
(-1.46)
-0.68
(-1.44)
-0.45
(-0.83)
Cm_l x Sp_l -8.01**
(-3.56)
-0.70
(-0.15)
1.34
(0.25)
3.92
(0.83)
0.78
(-1.18)
0.39
(0.51)
Cm_l x Sp_h 4.63*
(2.06)
-0.48
(-0.10)
6.70
(1.23)
3.38
(0.72)
0.02
(0.04)
-0.31
(-0.41)
Cm_h x Sp_l 2.03
(0.90)
10.0*
(2.19)
8.55
(1.58)
7.73
(1.64)
-0.57
(-0.87)
-0.61
(-0.80)
Cm_h x Sp_h -5.72**
(-2.54)
-10.3*
(-2.25)
4.00
(0.74)
-3.71
(-0.79)
0.28
(0.42)
-1.05
(-1.36)
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.84 0.78 0.53 0.51 0.39
Note: t-values are in parentheses.
      * Significant at the 5-% level.
    ** Significant at the 1-% level.
Table B Short run survival rates Long run survival rates
Quality
regime
Intermediate
regime
Network
regime
Quality
regime
Intermediate
regime
Network
regime
Constant 43.9**
(19.9)
52.1**
(29.1)
49.8**
(36.4)
31.6**
(17.2)
43.9**
(25.2)
30.5**
(21.9)
Cm_l 5.70
(1.82)
3.89
(1.54)
-0.23
(-0.88)
1.63
(0.63)
0.93
(0.11)
-1.12
(-0.57)
Cm_h -13.2**
(-4.22)
-17.5**
(-6.94)
-4.38*
(-2.26)
-8.38**
(-3.22)
-13.0**
(-5.28)
-2.80
(-1.42)
Sp_l 4.57
(1.46)
9.52**
(3.77)
5.06**
(2.62)
-1.98
(-0.76)
6.17**
(2.51)
0.08
(0.04)
Sp_h -1.87
(-0.60)
-4.30
(-1.70)
-0.24
(-0.12)
-2.26
(-0.87)
-2.57
(-1.05)
0.78
(0.40)
Cm_l x Sp_l -4.11
(-0.93)
-2.91
(-0.81)
-0.54
(-0.20)
-0.23
(-0.06)
-4.59
(-1.32)
0.14
(0.05)
Cm_l x Sp_h -1.22
(-0.28)
0.47
(0.13)
0.10
(0.04)
3.21
(0.87)
2.03
(0.58)
0.80
(0.29)
Cm_h x Sp_l 1.29
(0.29)
7.91*
(2.21)
-0.11
(-0.04)
3.75
(1.64)
5.32
(1.53)
1.38
(0.49)
Cm_h x Sp_h 1.14
(0.26)
-2.00
(-0.56)
1.74
(0.64)
2.66
(0.72)
-4.69
(-1.35)
1.70
(0.61)
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.78 0.25 0.26 0.66 0.00
Note: t-values are in parentheses.
      * Significant at the 5-% level.
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    ** Significant at the 1-% level.
Table C Mean age of exiters Mean age at t = 5000
Quality
regime
Intermediate
regime
Network
regime
Quality
regime
Intermediate
regime
Network
regime
Constant 913**
(28.8)
1176**
(22.0)
840**
(24.0)
1852**
(8.30)
2937**
(31.9)
2374**
(22.0)
Cm_l -154**
(-3.44)
-357**
(-4.72)
43.3
(0.88)
-409
(-1.30)
-909**
(-6.98)
-141
(-0.92)
Cm_h -168**
(-3.75)
55.7
(0.74)
-187**
(-3.78)
865**
(2.74)
890**
(6.83)
64.2
(0.42)
Sp_l -247**
(-5.51)
121
(1.60)
-80.8**
(-1.64)
-571
(-1.81)
-662**
(-5.08)
-121
(-0.79)
Sp_h -22.8
(-0.51)
-495**
(-6.54)
-85.1
(-1.72)
172
(0.55)
357**
(2.74)
148
(0.97)
Cm_l x Sp_l 164**
(2.58)
98.2
(0.92)
71.7
(1.03)
426
(0.95)
572**
(3.10)
-58.2
(-0.27)
Cm_l x Sp_h 98.4
(1.55)
119
(1.11)
16.2
(0.23)
65.9
(0.15)
-69.1
(-0.38)
-22.6
(-0.11)
Cm_h x Sp_l 161**
(2.54)
-129
(-1.21)
127
(1.81)
-33.9
(-0.08)
-397*
(-2.16)
-251
(-1.16)
Cm_h x Sp_h 139*
(2.19)
-125
(-1.17)
-8.83
(-0.13)
-524
(-1.17)
-86.2
(-0.47)
-202
(-0.94)
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.75 0.43 0.26 0.86 0.10
Note: t-values are in parentheses.
      * Significant at the 5-% level.
    ** Significant at the 1-% level.
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The Research Programme
The DRUID-research programme is organised in 3 different research themes:
- The firm as a learning organisation
- Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
- The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation
In each of the three areas there is one strategic theoretical and one
central empirical and policy oriented orientation.
Theme A: The firm as a learning organisation  
The theoretical perspective confronts and combines the resource-based view (Penrose, 1959)
with recent approaches where the focus is on learning and the dynamic capabilities of the firm
(Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992). The aim of this theoretical work is to develop an analytical
understanding of the firm as a learning organisation.
The empirical and policy issues relate to the nexus technology, productivity, organisational
change and human resources. More insight in the dynamic interplay between these factors at
the level of the firm is crucial to understand international differences in performance at the
macro level in terms of economic growth and employment.
Theme B: Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
The theoretical perspective relates to the dynamics of the inter-firm division of labour and the
formation of network relationships between firms. An attempt will be made to develop
evolutionary models with Schumpeterian innovations as the motor driving a Marshallian
evolution of the division of labour.
The empirical and policy issues relate the formation of knowledge-intensive regional and
sectoral networks of firms to competitiveness and structural change. Data on the structure of
production will be combined with indicators of knowledge and learning. IO-matrixes which
include flows of knowledge and new technologies will be developed and supplemented by
data from case-studies and questionnaires.
Theme C: The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation.
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The third theme aims at a stronger conceptual and theoretical base for new concepts such as
'systems of innovation' and 'the learning economy' and to link these concepts to the ecological
dimension. The focus is on the interaction between institutional and technical change in a
specified geographical space. An attempt will be made to synthesise theories of economic
development emphasising the role of science based-sectors with those emphasising learning-
by-producing and the growing knowledge-intensity of all economic activities.
The main empirical and policy issues are related to changes in the local dimensions of
innovation and learning. What remains of the relative autonomy of national systems of
innovation? Is there a tendency towards convergence or divergence in the specialisation in
trade, production, innovation and in the knowledge base itself when we compare regions and
nations?
The Ph.D.-programme
There are at present more than 10 Ph.D.-students working in close connection to the DRUID
research programme. DRUID organises regularly specific Ph.D-activities such as workshops,
seminars and courses, often in a co-operation with other Danish or international institutes.
Also important is the role of DRUID as an environment which stimulates the Ph.D.-students
to become creative and effective. This involves several elements:
- access to the international network in the form of visiting fellows and visits at the   sister
institutions
- participation in research projects
- access to supervision of theses
- access to databases
Each year DRUID welcomes a limited number of foreign Ph.D.-students who wants to work
on subjects and project close to the core of the DRUID-research programme.
External projects
DRUID-members are involved in projects with external support. One major project which
covers several of the elements of the research programme is DISKO; a comparative analysis
of the Danish Innovation System; and there are several projects involving international co-
operation within EU's 4th Framework Programme. DRUID is open to host other projects as
far as they fall within its research profile. Special attention is given to the communication of
research results from such projects to a wide set of social actors and policy makers.
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